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Chapter 2 
 
Food Security and International Agricultural Trade Regulation: Old 
Problems, New Perspectives 
 
Fiona Smith*  
I. Introduction  
 
How can the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) rules on international agricultural trade 
address food security more effectively? This is a question taxing trade negotiators, policy 
officials outside the WTO and many eminent academic commentators. There is such a 
wealth of institutional literature and academic commentary advocating changes to the 
WTO’s international agricultural trade rules beyond those in the Doha Draft Modalities 
for Agriculture that it is easy to get swept along with the strong impetus for fundamental 
change. (WTO 2008) Recent events have ensured that food security is high on the 
political agenda too.  
 
The 2010 Russian wheat export ban is putting pressure on international wheat supplies. 
Russia is the world’s fourth largest wheat exporter and its export ban means supply 
problems for many WTO Members. Argentina too retains long-term restrictions on the 
export of agricultural products. In 2008, the Argentinean government introduced further 
higher variable export taxes on beef, soybeans and oilseeds, together with slightly lower 
rates for maize and wheat, on domestic food security grounds. (Nogués 2008) The 
effectiveness of this policy is questionable. Argentina suffered a severe social and 
economic crisis in 2002. Export taxes were introduced as a very quick way to generate 
crucial income to alleviate the severe poverty rates. Whilst this policy alleviated the worst 
problems in the short term, the long-term effects were surprising. The Nogués study 
shows these taxes actually led to a reduction in agricultural production, an increase in 
rural employment and consumer prices for food. The high export taxes operated as a 
disincentive to produce. Farmers were unable to compete effectively on export markets as 
the export price was artificially inflated by the tax, so their production was either diverted 
straight onto the domestic consumer market, or to the domestic processing industry. The 
price farmers received for their products was kept artificially low by the tax, so as some 
of the revenue from the tax was not diverted to farmers as compensation, they received 
less income over time. As a consequence, the farmers switched production to other non-
taxed agricultural products, or, more often, left farming completely. The result was a 
decline in food supply and an increase in unemployment as farms closed. Whilst 
consumers benefited from artificially depressed food prices in the short term as the 
farmers had no incentive other than to supply the domestic market; in the long term, 
farmers adjusted their production and consumer prices increased as domestic supplies 
food was sourced from outside the country (Financial Times 2010). As rural 
unemployment increased with the decline in farms, so consumers became less able to 
afford to buy the food that was produced. The policy resulted in significant civil unrest in 
Argentina itself as agricultural producers staged a blockade of major routes as a protest 
against their ability to export and so gain higher revenue for their products. The decline in 
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Argentinean exports also contributed to the overall decline in the volume of food 
available on world markets, thereby putting further upward pressure on world food 
prices.  
 
The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) met in September 2010 to highlight the 
rise in food prices caused by supply problems and discuss what measures could be put in 
place to prevent another major food crisis like that of 2008. Pressure will inevitably fall 
on trade negotiators to ensure the new international agricultural trade rules also 
adequately address food security. But before the trade negotiators rush to change the rules 
and the current Draft Modalities in line with these ideas on food security, a word of 
caution should be sounded. A commonly held view is that changing all the international 
agricultural trade rules on food security necessarily implies improving them and, as a 
corollary, that retaining the existing rules unchanged is a retrograde step. So, it is thought, 
unless great changes occur, the existing rules remain stagnant, unresponsive to 
contemporary political problems and so are unable to fully address contemporary 
problems, such as food security. Change is not inevitably improvement, rather, it is more 
synonymous with disturbance: for good and bad. Even when it seems obvious that the 
existing international agricultural rules should be changed to more fully accommodate all 
aspects of food security, there will be other effects that may have been overlooked. These 
other consequential effects may, in fact, adversely impact on different aspects of 
international agricultural trade regulation in a profound way.  
 
This point is best illustrated with an example already referred to above. Argentina’s 
export tax on agricultural products appeared to be an excellent way to address its 
domestic food supply problems and rural poverty. Amending the rules was thought to 
only ever lead to positive effects for its farmers, the rural population and consumers. 
However, the reality was much more complex: farmers and consumers did gain in the 
short term, but the long term effects were much less predictable; food production 
declined, farmers moved out of agricultural production and domestic food prices 
increased. So changes to the existing international agricultural trade rules do not only 
lead to positive improvements in the way the international agricultural trade rules deal 
with food security; they also create an entire new regulatory environment for 
international agricultural trade where the ‘better’ rules on food security are only one 
dimension. So, change is always more extensive than is originally anticipated. Whilst it 
may be true ultimately that changes to the rules do mean food security problems are more 
successfully resolved by the international agricultural trade rules; equally, it may mean 
that this innovation causes, at the same time, a significant modification in the nature of 
international agricultural trade regulation as a whole. The WTO’s international 
agricultural trade rules may address food security, but the temptation to overload the 
WTO’s international agricultural trade for those rules to address all dimensions of food 
security should therefore be resisted. It is important to fully understand the richness of the 
current international agricultural trade rules’ treatment of the problem of food security 
and the proposals for change before trade negotiators move ahead and make changes. 
Since, contrary to current thinking, it may be that the existing rules are more able to 
accommodate some contemporary food security concerns and only small, incremental 
change is necessary.  
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The discussion is in three parts. First, Part II will look at the way the existing 
international agricultural trade rules’ and Draft Modalities’ relationship with food 
security is traditionally described, how problems are identified and solutions crafted. Part 
III will show how this is not the only way to look at this relationship; that it is possible to 
adopt a different perspective and so discover new truths about the interaction of the rules, 
the Draft Modalities and food security. I also show the ways in which this new 
perspective changes how the international agricultural trade rules’ impact on food 
security is thought to happen and what the appropriate solution is. Finally, Part IV will 
draw some conclusions and show why it is not necessarily inevitable that the existing 
international agricultural trade rules’ treatment of food security be fundamentally 
changed. 
 
II. International agricultural trade regulation & food security: old problems, 
traditional perspectives 
 
How do the existing international agricultural trade rules affect food security? Where are 
the problems with the rules’ coverage and effects and how can these problems be 
resolved? Do the Draft Modalities help, or merely add new problems to an already 
complex and difficult symbiotic relationship? A common way to analyse these questions 
in the context of international agricultural trade regulation is to focus on whether the 
existing rules address food security effectively and how the Draft Modalities improve that 
effectiveness. Effectiveness is explored in two overlapping ways. First, how the rules 
strike the balance between trade and food security and what practical effect this balance 
has for Members’ domestic agricultural policies and international agricultural trade in 
general. Second, the ways the rules cause food insecurity, either by their internal 
deficiencies (i.e. in the way they are drafted or the values they represent and promote) or 
because Members have not fully implemented them.  
 
In each instance of effectiveness, a common starting point from which the rules are 
analysed is a definition of food security. The most commonly used definition is the Rome 
Declaration on World Food Security from the 1996 World Food Summit. (WFS 1996) 
Under paragraph 1, food security is said to exist “when all people, at all times, have 
physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary 
needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.”1 It is thought that assessing the 
international agricultural trade rules to the Rome Declaration in this way is the key to 
showing how effective the rules are, how they impact on food security and where the 
problems are. Once the problems with the existing rules are fully articulated in this way, 
the effectiveness of the Draft Modalities can be properly assessed and appropriate 
proposals for changes to the rules can be framed.  
 
So, for example, Christian Häberli predicates his critique of the international agricultural 
trade rules and Doha proposals’ inability to address food security on a particular version 
of the Rome Declaration. For Häberli (2010, 298), food security is “continuing access, by 
way of either domestic production or trade to quantitatively and qualitatively adequate 
food, including for the poorest segments.” From this starting point, he then shows how 
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Members’ domestic agricultural policies, like subsidies on biofuels, export bans and 
declines in levels of food aid all contribute to food insecurity; how these policies 
adversely impact on net-food importing developing countries (NFIDCs) through high 
commodity prices, reduce cheap imports of food and lead to growing balance of 
payments problems and, finally, how the international agricultural trade rules are unable 
to prevent such distortions and in fact exacerbate them. (Häberli 2010, 302-08)  
 
From his perspective, the current market access rules do not give full access to 
developing country agricultural exports because developed countries retained high tariffs 
despite Members’ market access reduction commitments. Domestic support reduction 
commitments do not fully reign in subsidised agricultural production, and food dumping 
remained prevalent, even through food aid. (Häberli 2010, 304) In addition, the export 
subsidy commitments in the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) did not fully address the 
needs of net-food importing nations heavily dependent on food aid for their food security 
needs. The existing international agricultural trade rules do not fully anticipate that whilst 
food aid is an important part of famine relief, it has the power in the long term to displace 
domestic production. (Desta 2001, 457) Developed country Members also use food aid, 
sometimes perniciously, as a way to dump excess food production (irrespective of the 
recipient country’s needs) and to avoid their export subsidy reduction commitments. 
(Häberli 2010, 307) The conclusion is, therefore, the existing rules do not as yet fully 
address this aspect of food security, but they should. 
  
Other commentators focus on the Rome Declaration to critique the WTO’s impact on the 
problem of food security and climate change. For example, a 2006 UK government report 
showed how temperatures are predicted to rise by 2-3% globally over the next fifty years 
and how this will have negative impacts on agricultural yields, particularly in Africa. 
Water will cease to be so readily available and, as a consequence, agricultural yields will 
drop. World cereals yields will also be hit. (Stern 2006 and Defra 2006) Climactic 
variations, paradoxically, also cause severe flooding with consequential adverse effects 
on production. (Keleman et al 2010) Pressure on food supplies as a result of growing 
demand for food is inevitable. When assessing the international agricultural trade rules 
against the Rome Declaration in the context of climate change, the commentators found 
the rules only exacerbate food supply problems in such cases in two linked ways: first, 
the flexibility in Article XI GATT and Article 12 AoA allow major wheat exporters, like 
Ukraine, to impose export bans as a way of managing its own population’s food 
demands, thereby causing even greater restrictions on available food for net-food 
importers. (Defra 2010) The rules also encourage countries to develop trade in sectors 
where they have a comparative advantage. If a country’s comparative advantage is not in 
agriculture, it becomes increasingly dependent on trade and may not remain self-
sufficient in food production. As the WTO encourages liberalized trade in agricultural 
products, the rules are then thought to effectively restrict the availability of nutritious 
foods: that is, they make a Member food insecure. From a climate change perspective, it 
may be better to discourage over-dependence on trade to meet domestic food needs and, 
as a corollary, suggest greater political flexibility be put into the WTO rules to enable 
Members to encourage domestic production. (Defra 2006, 35-50) 
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Other commentators consider the relationship between the international agricultural trade 
rules, food security and sustainable farming techniques. Here, the emphasis is on the 
availability of land on which to grow food. ‘Land grab’ in areas of sub-Saharan Africa by 
countries like China, Saudi Arabia, South Korea and Kuwait for the purposes of 
alleviating their food supply problems, is thought to put severe stress on Sub-Saharan 
food supplies. (BBC 2009) It reduces the amount of land available for cultivation 
domestically and thereby reduces available income generated from the land. (Coula et al 
2009) The Rome Declaration definition of food security makes it clear that people should 
have “physical and economic access” to food. Clearly land grab severely impedes that 
access. Neither of these issues is addressed in the existing international agricultural trade 
rules and commentators argue that they should.  
 
It is clear from the discussion so far that one way of exploring the relationship between 
the international agricultural trade rules and food security is to use a definition like that in 
the Rome Declaration as a fixed determinant of what food security should be and then 
assess the international agricultural trade rules and Draft Modalities to it. Where the rules 
and Modalities address the same issue, or they have no adverse impact, the rules and 
Modalities are thought to address food security adequately. However, where the rules and 
Draft Modalities do not address the same dimensions of food security in the Rome 
Declaration or impede them, then they are thought to be deficient. Accordingly, the 
existing rules and the emphasis in the Draft Modalities must be adjusted in such a way 
that ensures the final body of rules will ensure international agricultural trade (at least 
under the WTO rules) meets every dimension of the food security definition in the Rome 
Declaration.2 But a different picture emerges if the starting point for analysis is shifted 
away from a definition of food security that is in a different legal instrument to the WTO 
rules and is instead shifted to the rules themselves. In other words, once an analysis of the 
rules, the Draft Modalities and food security focuses on what the rules and Draft 
Modalities themselves say about food security, then it is possible to see what food 
security is in international agricultural trade regulation and why changing the rules to 
accommodate a wider, more nuanced understanding of food security based on a 
definition like the Rome Declaration is more problematic than it first appears. This new 
approach looks at all the same problems as existing commentators, but it brings new 
perspectives to these problems together with new ideas about how to view changes to the 
rules.  
 
In one sense, this new form of analysis describes what the rules and Draft Modalities say 
about food security. For it proceeds by analysing the wording of the existing international 
agricultural trade rules and the Draft Modalities in order to show what problems of food 
security the current rules are designed to address and how the Draft Modalities modifies 
that picture. At the same time, this description reveals deeper truths about the 
fundamental nature of international agricultural trade regulation and the place food 
security occupies within it. (Smith 2010) On this new view, rules are more than just 
“container[s] for the transmission of messages” to direct Members to formulate their 
domestic agricultural policies on food security in a certain way. (White 1990, ix) Instead, 
the existing international agricultural trade rules and Draft Modalities are also the 
embodiment of a political choice to regulate some aspects of food security and not others 
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and to regulate those chosen aspects in certain ways. This political choice is, in turn, part 
of a larger vision about how international agricultural trade should be regulated in the 
WTO. Specifically, what problems should be regulated; how they should be regulated; 
who is subject to the rules; who is the target of the rules; what non-trade concerns are; 
which non-trade concerns are relevant to the regulation of international agricultural trade 
in the WTO and how the balance between trade and non-trade concerns should be struck; 
and, finally, what the scope of the rules’ impact should be. (OECD 2010, 9)  
 
It would be disingenuous to describe these choices about food security and agricultural 
trade regulation as wholly detached from Members’ domestic political imperatives and 
trade negotiators’ need to make political trade-offs in the Uruguay Round multilateral 
trade talks and the Doha Development Round. What can be said though is that, 
irrespective of the motivation for the choices, only certain problems of food security are 
regulated in the existing international agricultural trade rules, and they are regulated in a 
certain way. When the existing international agricultural trade rules and Draft Modalities 
are understood in this deeper way, it becomes apparent that changing them to address 
every dimension of food security highlighted in the current literature, is not only a 
question of adding in extra, ‘better’ language. It is also about changing the fundamental 
nature of the political vision for international agricultural trade in the WTO as a whole. In 
the next section, the discussion describes how the existing international agricultural trade 
rules address food security as a way of also revealing what dimensions of food security 
the rules focus on and the political choices that underpin that regulation. It will then show 
how the Draft Modalities adjust that picture and what the implications of that adjustment 
are. The final section of this article addresses the tricky issue of reform. 
 
III. International agricultural trade regulation & food security: old problems, 
new perspectives 
 
The existing international agricultural trade rules in the AoA and the Decision on 
Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-
Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries (the NFIDC Decision) are 
designed to address one particular problem of food security: that is, that as food becomes 
more expensive as a consequence of the removal of price support mechanisms in 
Members’ domestic agricultural policies under the WTO rules on international 
agricultural trade, so some countries may find it difficult to maintain their food supply. 
Since, it is implicit in liberal market economics that price support mechanisms used in 
domestic agricultural policies in the period before the WTO rules artificially kept the 
costs of agricultural production low by off-setting the true costs of production through the 
payment of domestic subsidies to farmers. (Anderson and Martin 2006, 31) These 
subsidies allowed farmers to sell their products cheaply on domestic and international 
markets to gain market share without any substantial loss of revenue. Export subsidies to 
domestic farmers further supported that production model by keeping the export price of 
the domestically produced product artificially low, as the difference between the low 
export price and the true costs of production were met by the export subsidy; and, finally, 
various import barriers insulated domestic farmers from competition imports of 
agricultural products from countries, like Kenya who enjoy a comparative advantage in 
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agricultural production. Reducing these price support mechanisms causes price rises in 
the short term because the true costs of agricultural production will now feed directly into 
the export price of agricultural products; food aid supplies will also be vulnerable. (Clapp 
2004)  
 
The NFIDC Decision specifically acknowledges in paragraph 2 that the relevant 
countries, in particular, may experience food supply problems as a consequence of this 
liberalization programme in the WTO rules on international agricultural trade, but, the 
paragraph 6 of the Preamble of the AoA, also makes it clear that the rules will provide 
some relief from the price support reduction commitments in the Agreement for any 
Member that suffers from food supply problems as a result of the implementation of the 
reforms to their domestic agricultural policies. 
 
The existing international agricultural trade rules are all orientated around ameliorating 
this food supply problem therefore. Relief from the reduction commitments on food 
security (i.e. food supply) grounds is provided in each of the three pillars of the 
Agreement: market access, domestic support and export competition commitments. In 
terms of market access, generally the rules require all non-tariff barriers to be converted 
into tariffs under Article 4.2 AoA. However, the rules do provide Members some 
temporary and very limited relief from the conversion process on food security grounds. 3 
Annex 5A AoA potentially allows all Members to exclude border measures on “any 
primary product and its worked and/or prepared products” where the product, inter alia 
has been designated in the Member’s tariff schedule for special treatment that reflects 
“factors of non-trade concerns such as food security…” (Annex 5A para1(d)); whereas 
under Annex 5B, developing country Members can exclude non-tariff measures from 
tariffication where the measure concerned relates to a primary agricultural product that is 
the “predominant staple in the traditional diet” and where it complies with Annex 5A 
paras 1(a)-(d). Retention of non-tariff barriers under these circumstances seems to allow 
more targeted protection of domestically sensitive agricultural products from the import 
of cheap agricultural products produced with the benefit of large domestic subsidies.  
However, the Annex 5 exemption was time limited and only available if the specific 
narrow circumstances specified in Annex 5 were complied with, including a minimum 
market access commitment which exceeded that required under Article 4.2. In reality, 
only Japan, Korea, the Philippines and Israel made such reservations in their Schedules 
and Japan suspended its use of the provision in 1998. (Desta, 2002).  
 
Concerns that domestic agricultural production would be overwhelmed by the flood of 
cheap agricultural imports following the tariffication of non-tariff barriers and the new 
tariff bindings was also alleviated by the inclusion of the special safeguard provision in 
Article 5. Article 5 allows a Member to impose additional import duties on products it 
designates as particularly vulnerable in its Schedule (i.e. by using the symbol SSG in 
their Schedule for the product in question) when either there is an increase in the volume 
of imports in excess of a pre-determined trigger level, or decrease in the import price 
below the trigger level. (Article 5.1(a) and (b)). Article 5 allows countries, who have so 
designated their ‘tariffied’ products, to respond to such import surges if there is a genuine 
threat to the domestic food supply or where there is only a perceived threat, as the Article 
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5 does not require the Member to show there is actually injury or threat of injury to their 
food supplies. (Desta, 2002)  
 
The rules on domestic support also provide exemption from the reduction commitments 
in Part IV of the AoA where Members want to maintain food supplies, but do not wish to 
be dependent on external sources of food. Annex 2 AoA allows Members to exclude 
payments to their domestic farmers either because they are stockpiling important 
foodstuffs (paragraph 3), or they wish to give food aid to a sector of their population 
(paragraph 4). The former allows Members to claim exemption if the money is given to 
their farmers for the purchase and accumulation of essential food stocks as part of an 
“integral part of a food security programme identified in national legislation.” This 
exemption also extends to government payments made to private contractors who store 
the goods on behalf of the government. In both cases, the exemption is only available if 
certain prescribed criteria are met, notably that the volume and accumulation of the 
stocks must not exceed certain “predetermined targets” that relate solely to food security, 
that the accumulation and purchase process is fully transparent and that purchases and 
sales of the accumulated products are made at current market prices. For Members to 
claim exemption from their domestic support commitments for their food aid 
programmes under paragraph 4, the Member must show that the food aid programme has 
clearly defined nutritional objectives; that the food is either to be given in kind or in 
subsidised food to eligible individuals and that any purchase of food made by the 
Member for these purposes, must be made at commercial rates. This exemption is 
available, according to the first paragraph of Annex 2, to all Members, irrespective of 
their status and is subject to the general over-riding proviso that such support has “no, or 
at most minimal effects on production.” The NFIDC Decision does recognise that forcing  
Members to buy food at market prices for their domestic food aid programmes to gain the 
advantage of the exemption in paragraph 4 may be particularly problematic for NFIDCs 
as the high costs may mean access to adequate foodstuffs is difficult. Paragraph 3 of the 
NFIDC Decision therefore seeks to off-set that food supply problem: Members agree to 
“establish appropriate mechanisms to ensure that the implementation of the … [reform 
programme] does not adversely affect the availability of food aid at a level which is 
sufficient to continue to provide assistance in meeting the needs of developing countries 
….” 
 
In the context of the export subsidy reduction commitments, the food supply problem is 
understood in a different way. Members are required to make specific reduction 
commitments for their use of export subsidies (Part V AoA). Only those existing export 
subsidies which meet the criteria in Article 9 are permitted (subject to reduction 
commitments); Article 10 contains anti-circumvention provisions. Articles 8-10 do 
impact on the exporting Member’s agricultural policies as the reduction commitments 
mean the amount of agricultural products subsidised reduces, with the result that the 
dumping of excess agricultural production on to third countries’ markets should reduce 
too. Article 10 specifically limits the circumstances where an exporting Member can 
claim exemption from its export subsidy reduction commitments on the grounds it is 
exporting products as food aid. The rules are therefore also protecting the importing 
country’s food supply in two ways: first, they attempt to prevent dumping of agricultural 
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produce well below the cost of production in the importing country which then drives 
domestic producers out of the market; second, when food is exported as food aid ‘in kind’ 
Article 10 seeks to protect the food supplied to the ultimate consumer is in fact nutritious 
and in accordance with the dietary needs of the local population. Article 10.4 therefore 
requires donors of international food aid to ensure that their provision of aid is “not 
tied…to commercial exports” of agricultural products to the donee country; that the food 
aid is provided in accordance with recognised requirements in the FAO’s Principles of 
Surplus Disposal and Consultative Obligations and that it is given in grant form wherever 
possible, or at least on the terms of the Food Aid Convention. The move towards genuine 
food aid is also recognised in paragraph 3 of the NFIDC Decision.  
 
Members who are net-food exporters are also able to address food supply problems. In 
such Members’ case, problems occur when domestic food production is significantly 
curtailed due to production conditions, like bad weather for example. In such 
circumstances, such Members fear that there will be insufficient food for their domestic 
population if the usual levels of export trade in agricultural products concerned are 
maintained. Article XI:2(a) GATT allows Members to impose temporary export 
restrictions on key domestic agricultural products “to prevent or relieve critical shortages 
of foodstuffs…” This provision was modified by Article 12 AoA, which makes it clear 
that, prior to implementing an export ban, the Member is required to “give due 
consideration” to the food security needs of importing Members. Full details of the 
measure, particularly its general nature and its duration must be given to the Committee 
on Agriculture. There is a duty to consult other Members who may have a substantial 
interest in the export ban, like NFIDCs who are reliant on those exports. (Hermann and 
Peters 2010) Article 12 also imposes a duty to provide further detailed information to 
those Members if a request is made. Different arrangements apply to export bans imposed 
by developing countries, although these special arrangements do not apply if the 
developing country concerned is a net-exporter of the specific agricultural product which 
is subject to the export restriction. 
 
It is evident that the current international agricultural trade rules are focused on solving 
one particular problem in the context of food security: that is, the adverse effect of the 
liberalization programme on food supplies for WTO Members, particularly the NFIDCs. 
What do the policy choices made in the rules reveal about the way food security is 
addressed in the existing international agricultural trade rules? 
 
Food security is not an end in itself for the existing rules. Rather, as paragraph 3 of the 
AoA’s Preamble states, the rules’ objectives are in fact to liberalize international 
agricultural trade and push WTO Members towards policy choices that are more market-
oriented and less focused on short-term domestic political imperatives. Food security’s 
relevance to the rules is then reduced to a factor that must be weighed against the market 
liberalization objective. As paragraph 6 of the Preamble specifically states, Members’ 
agricultural support reduction commitments “under the reform programme, should be 
made in an equitable way among Members, having regard to non-trade concerns 
including food security.” Food security is not the only non-trade concern listed in the 
AoA, but is one of a number of non-trade objectives listed, together with environmental 
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preservation, special and differential treatment and the potential adverse effects on 
NFIDCs of the reforms instituted by the Agreement. The balance envisaged by the 
Agreement is one between the market liberalization objective and each non-trade concern 
considered as a distinct challenge for the liberalization agenda. The relationship and 
balance between competing non-trade concerns in the context of agriculture, like 
maximising food security but on sustainable land-use principles, or not maximising 
production in ways that exacerbate climate change are irrelevant considerations for the 
existing rules. (FAO 2008) This balance is something for the Member to decide within its 
own domestic agricultural policy. Whilst the Member may have undertaken international 
commitments on climate change and development which influence how its domestic 
agricultural policy may be constructed, it is not for the WTO to force the Member into 
acceding to these international commitments through the ‘back door’ by prescribing how 
the balance between non-trade concerns should be addressed through the current 
international agricultural trade rules; the policy choice remains largely under the control 
of the Member therefore. 
 
Food security is not defined at any point in the AoA or in the NFIDC Decision. Article 1 
of the AoA defines the terms used in the Agreement as a whole is a substantial provision 
and contains over nine definitions of the terms used in the rules. Some of the definitions 
are used to calculate the level of a Member’s domestic support for the purposes of the 
reduction commitments in the AoA and each run to more than one paragraph. It is clear 
therefore that the trade negotiators’ attention was drawn to the need to include a 
definition section in the rules and that they understood its importance for the 
effectiveness of the rules. The omission of a definition of food security appears deliberate 
and implies that food security is not a matter for the rules per se, but is something 
separate which is to be determined by other international agreements and/or by the WTO 
Member. It is then for the Member to decide what is most appropriate for the needs of its 
domestic population in food security terms. Whether the policies work and the Members’ 
population benefit is not a relevant consideration for the current international agricultural 
trade rules. 
  
As a corollary to this, an individual’s right to nutritious, safe food that meets their dietary 
needs, or whether the needs of different sections of the population are addressed, like 
those of women, within the Member’s food security policy is also outside the rules. Even 
when the NFIDC Decision notes the importance of recognising the negative impact of the 
reform programme on food security, this is described only in terms of the problems the 
Member has in terms of its food security policy. Paragraph 2 states that Members 
recognise that “least-developed and net-food importing developing countries” might feel 
the effect, not that their populations must suffer as a result of the reform programme 
before the Member can rely on the more liberal regime in the Decision. The Member has 
considerable autonomy to determine whether it is experiencing food security problems or 
not, and when it can react to those problems. 
 
The current rules also only recognise food supply difficulties for four homogenous types 
of Member: the developed country, the developing country, the least developed country 
and the NFIDC. The NFIDC Decision highlights particular difficulties in terms of access 
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to food aid for NFIDCs, but beyond this rather crude division between the four categories 
of state in the rules, there is no recognition about the actual food security challenges for 
each Member and the fact that a range of policy choices may be better for those states at 
different times. Some Members might be particularly vulnerable either because their 
agricultural production is erratic or their climate unpredictable causing food supply 
problems in some years and not others. (WFP 2010) Or even that food aid supplies to 
them are unpredictable and domestic production is unable to cope with the unpredictable 
shortfalls in supply. (Stevens et al 2000, 14-15) Such Members are not part of a 
homogenous group and their Membership fluctuates over time just as their needs do. 
These complex and ever-changing needs are not relevant considerations for the current 
rules. Rather, these difficulties fall outside the WTO framework and are covered by other 
organisations and legal regimes; and/or the Members themselves are thought to be best 
placed to formulate the most appropriate solutions for their domestic situation. In either 
case, the WTO’s rules only purport to offer a framework to increase the market 
orientation of existing rules and their fairness, increased trade may be an incidental 
effects of these rules. The final resolution of the other dimensions of food security 
suffered by these countries is not thought to lie with the WTO. 
 
So the focus in the balance between food security and the market liberalization objective 
in the existing international agricultural rules is not a balance between the need to keep 
markets open and food security policies that actually work. Rather it is a balance between 
allowing a Member to pursue its own food security policy without any external 
regulatory constraints and one where certain limitations on Members’ policy space are 
necessarily imposed. 
  
Both the AoA and the NFIDC Decision do place some distinct limits on a Member’s 
autonomy, but these limits are mainly focused only on one dimension of their food 
security policies. For, it is the measures Members use to achieve food security that are the 
subject of the rules, not their policy as such; and it is primarily those measures which 
restrict the inflow of agricultural products into Members’ domestic markets that the 
existing rules concentrate on. The rules are principally import-focused therefore. 
Measures regarded as prohibited restrictions for the purposes of the rules are those taking 
the form of non-transparent quantitative restrictions as these directly impede the free-
flow of imports at the border. Although Article 5 AoA, allows Members some relief from 
the adverse effects of the reduction of import barriers on food security grounds, this is 
generally only in the form of additional duties and is not a return to the use of highly 
distortive quotas or other non-tariff barriers. It is also only available on a temporary basis. 
Annex 5’s exemption on food security grounds from the tariffication commitment only 
applies in a very limited range of circumstances; most notably where imports of the 
product were at historically very low levels, where effective production-limiting 
measures are applied to the primary product and where export subsidies have not been 
imposed on the product in question. Minimum access commitments must still be given in 
accordance with the explicit provisions of Annex 5A. Even where a Member is able to 
restrict imports on food security grounds because the product is also the “predominant 
staple in the traditional diet of a developing country” imports of the product must still be 
historically low, and the minimum access commitments must be given. The emphasis is 
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solely on keeping markets open and import restrictions are only permitted in very limited 
circumstances. 
  
In addition, payments or other forms of support given to farmers, outside permitted 
levels, that directly stimulate specific types of domestic agricultural production are 
restricted by the AoA because these are thought to distort the market for agricultural 
products by artificially depressing the costs of agricultural production and reducing the 
price to consumers of domestic agricultural products compared to imported ones. As 
noted above, it is possible for Members to gain exemption from payments to domestic 
farmers on food security grounds if the Member is purchasing food as part of a public 
stockholding programme or they are providing food aid to their population. However, in 
both cases, the nature of the food aid and stockholding programmes is not a matter for the 
rules: it does not matter what food the Member is purchasing, or whether the food truly 
meets the nutritional needs of its population. Rather, the concern is about the 
transparency of the measure, the price the Member buys the food and also, most 
importantly, whether the measure has “no, or at most minimal effects on domestic 
production” and is not an indirect subsidy to its domestic agricultural producers. These 
three concerns all relate to the measure’s potential effect on the market for the product in 
question: that is, whether domestic farmers are gaining a financial advantage as a result 
of the food security policy which will enable them to sell their products cheaply on 
international markets. Food security is not a concern per se, it is the measure’s potential 
to create cheap exports which might flood international markets which is the real worry.  
 
Finally, payments to farmers that off-set the costs of domestic agricultural production are 
severely restricted by the existing rules on the grounds that such export subsidies enable 
farmers to sell their products at more competitive prices on international markets to the 
detriment of those farmers who have not had the advantage of the export subsidy. It is the 
relationship between export subsidies and food aid which lies at the heart of the AoA’s 
provisions on export subsidies and food security. As noted, Article 10.4 is designed to 
address a particular problem: to prevent Members circumventing the export subsidy 
commitments by heavily subsidising commercial exports under the guise of food aid. 
What food aid is and whether Members’ policies meet the food security needs of 
developing and least-developed nations is not covered by the existing rules, but is instead 
pushed to the FAO under their Principles for Surplus Disposal and Consultative 
Obligations and the Food Aid Convention 1986. Whilst it is not inconceivable that the 
panels and Appellate Body might be called upon to interpret whether Members’ provision 
of food aid does in fact accord with these provisions, the over-riding objective in Article 
10 is to determine whether the Member is circumventing the export subsidy 
commitments. Even the NFIDC Decision only requires Members to agree to put 
appropriate mechanisms in place to maintain food aid flows, rather than to undertake any 
substantive commitment to strengthen food aid per se.  
 
The existing international agricultural trade rules focus on food security as a problem of 
food supply for four homogenous groups of WTO Member, rather than an end in itself. 
The relationship between food security and other non-trade concerns, like preservation of 
the environment, is not a matter for the rules. Instead, the rules are unconcerned whether 
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Members’ policies solve food security problems for the Member or whether individuals 
become more food secure. The rules address food supply problem in specific ways 
without distorting international agricultural trade markets more than necessary. All the 
other policy choices lie with the Member. The rules should not be thought to regard food 
security as an unimportant consideration simply because they do not address all its 
dimensions. Rather, the rules see food security as a domestic problem which is best 
addressed at national level. Understood in this way, the rules give more power to the 
Member to address food security rather than less. How is this picture changed by the 
Draft Modalities?  
 
Paragraph 13 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration sets out the negotiating objectives for 
the reform of international agricultural trade regulation. (WTO 2001) It reiterates the 
long-term objective of international agricultural trade regulation in the WTO remains to 
“establish a fair and market-oriented trading system” by reducing distortions in the 
market and eliminating export subsidies. The Draft Modalities still focus heavily on 
opening markets, reducing domestic support and eliminating export subsidies in ways 
designed to cut the levels of price support for international agricultural trade more 
effectively than the existing international agricultural trade rules. (WTO 2008) However 
there are subtle changes in the way food security is understood, which in turn suggests a 
small change in the political vision of international agricultural trade regulation for the 
WTO. 
 
Food security is still one of the factors that should be balanced against the liberalization 
objective, together with preservation of the environment and special and differential 
treatment. The balance between individual non-trade concerns is still not to be addressed 
and food security will not be an end in itself for the reformed rules if they are based on 
the December 2008 Draft Modalities. This means the rules should not address the 
problem of ‘land grab,’ the adverse impact on the environment caused by intensive 
farming production techniques, and the impact on climate change on food supply. So the 
problem of the environment remains understood in terms of access to food, rather than as 
a need to rectify any underlying environmental causes of food insecurity. The role of the 
international agricultural trade rules is still not to rectify the tensions between non-trade 
concerns in the trade context; this is for the Member to determine. 
 
The Draft Modalities continue to be heavily focused on the Member’s attempts to 
alleviate food security difficulties, rather than on individuals’ needs per se. However, 
unlike the current international agricultural trade rules, food security is now set within a 
more nuanced conception of special and differential treatment in the Draft Modalities that 
focuses on the needs of a wider range of developing countries. So, food security problems 
in recently acceded Members (RAMs), including a sub-category of small and vulnerable 
recently acceded Members, small and vulnerable economies more broadly, and 
developing, least developed countries and NFIDCs are targeted throughout the Draft 
Modalities. For example, paragraphs 7 and 17 on the calculation on the levels of domestic 
support, are designed to address the fact that NFIDCs are particularly vulnerable to price 
rises in agricultural commodities as a result of the required reductions in tariff levels in 
the reform programme. Both paragraphs exclude NFIDCs from the need to reduce their 
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domestic support, however, thereby allowing them to maintain support to bolster their 
domestic agricultural production. Likewise, the Draft Modalities in paragraphs 66 to 69 
also identify small low-income recently acceded Members, especially those with 
economies in transition, as experiencing particular difficulties because the reduction in 
tariff revenue from imports of agricultural products significantly reduces the revenue 
available to them for their broader food security policies. The Draft Modalities therefore 
allow slower implementation of market access commitments for these countries. 
  
Whilst it is clear in the Draft Modalities that the problem of food security remains one of 
food supply, there is a subtle shift to recognising that countries, in reality, experience 
food security problems in different ways. These ways are closely tied to the needs of their 
domestic population, how agricultural trade is organised domestically, and how it is best 
financed. However, this connection does not mean that the Draft Modalities require the 
Member to show their policies directly correct food insecurity for vulnerable sectors of 
their populations, or that the way they choose to organise and finance their domestic 
agricultural sectors is necessarily effective at bolstering domestic agricultural production. 
Rather, it is more a question of further expanding Members’ policy space so that each 
Member is able to use more appropriate measures it believes guarantees food supply 
more effectively. For example, in the context of market access commitments, the Draft 
Modalities still recognise that some developing country Members, especially NFIDCs, 
will be particularly vulnerable and may need valuable income gained from high tariffs on 
the import of agricultural products to alleviate food supply problems and rural poverty 
which can lead to vulnerable sectors of the population becoming food insecure. However, 
rather than simply suggesting these problems can be alleviated through temporary 
exclusion of certain key foodstuffs from the tariff bindings and meeting any deficit with 
food aid, the Draft Modalities in paragraphs 129 to 131 go further and expand the 
Member’s power and enable it to exclude specific food products from its reduction 
commitments on food security grounds. An illustrative list of these grounds is found in 
Annex F. It includes factors that relate a foodstuff directly to the nutritional needs of 
individuals; how vulnerable sectors of the population like women are dependent on 
certain foods; how many domestic farmers are producing a particular food and to how 
many people are employed in a food’s production. 
 
The Draft Modalities in Annex L acknowledge that the issue of food aid is a more 
complex problem than envisaged in the current international agricultural trade rules. They 
suggest that the amended rules should not simply concentrate on how Members might 
disguise export subsidies as food aid, which is essentially a supply-side problem, but 
should instead focus on the demand side of food aid. Food aid should therefore involve 
the provision of food that is nutritious for a Member’s domestic population and it should 
not lead to greater food insecurity. In particular, the donor must be aware that market 
conditions of the donee state may mean provision of food aid in a particular form is 
inadequate and, if given in that form, may actually displace domestic production and lead 
to greater food insecurity. The Draft Modalities further recognize that food aid should not 
just take the form of dumped produce from the donor Member, but should be more 
attuned to the actual needs of the recipient country. There is a deepening recognition of 
the appropriate nature of food aid in the Draft Modalities therefore. However, it is not an 
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acknowledgment that food aid must be given, nor, that the WTO is the appropriate 
regulatory environment in which to determine whether food aid per se is the most 
appropriate way to alleviate the food security problems of the receiving Member. 
 
The Draft Modalities do move the AoA towards a more nuanced and complex 
recognition of the problems developing countries face, especially in the context of food 
security. It is clear from the discussion that the Draft Modalities create even greater 
policy space for Members to adjust their policies in ways targeted towards their own 
particular domestic needs. Nevertheless, the Draft Modalities indicate that actually 
achieving food security remains an issue for each Member. It is not within the WTO’s 
competence to regulate food security directly, force Members to address particular food 
security objectives within their domestic agricultural policies, nor adjudicate on when a 
Member’s food security policies are working and when they are not. The needs of the 
individual, whilst relevant to allowing the Member greater flexibility in the choice of 
policy instrument, are not directly relevant to the rules. Non-trade food security 
objectives like the provision of micro-financing in domestic agricultural production, 
supporting the role of women in agriculture and labour migration to the cities away from 
farms are all outside the consideration of the rules. Should the existing international 
agricultural trade rules and the Draft Modalities be changed to accommodate more 
complex notions of food security? 
 
IV. Amending the rules: a step too far? 
 
It is tempting to believe that the existing international agricultural trade rules and Draft 
Modalities fail to strike the right balance between reducing protectionism in international 
agricultural trade and food security for the reasons highlighted in the first part of this 
discussion. Such a view sees the current regulatory framework as out of touch with the 
contemporary reality of food security problems; as blind to the suffering of people with 
insufficient access to food; as too wedded to free market economics as the instrument of 
change and as too reticent to expand the WTO’s scope, when it seems obvious that its 
dispute settlement system makes the WTO one of the most effective international regimes 
with the potential to successfully regulate many controversial areas of international 
relations. Changing the WTO to accommodate all dimensions of food security, by adding 
in extra rules into the existing framework on international agricultural trade that can be 
upheld through the dispute settlement system, seems to be the obvious way forward. But 
wide ranging innovation can have unexpected consequences. 
 
The Rome Declaration on World Food Security’s definition of food security has been 
referred to earlier in this discussion already. The existing international agricultural trade 
rules could be changed in line with the definition and objectives in the Rome Declaration. 
The Declaration regards food security as a problem for the individual and their 
household, but also as a problem for national, regional and global levels. It defines food 
security as “when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to 
sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an 
active and healthy life.” The problem the Declaration is designed to address is whether an 
individual has access to food: not only in terms of having food to eat, but also in terms of 
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an individual’s financial capacity to buy the right food. The right food is not merely that 
which provides the basic calorie intake, but is also food that the individual actually wants 
(either for their dietary needs, or because they enjoy it). In paragraphs 1 to 7 of the Rome 
Declaration, there is a role for national action, but also for regional and international co-
operation to ensure poverty eradication, economic stability and ultimately to guarantee 
food security. Food security imperatives should also take into account the complex 
balance between agricultural production, “sustainable management of natural resources” 
food aid, variations in climate and specific problems of certain developing countries, 
notably those in sub-Saharan Africa. (FAO 2010)  
 
Changing the way the existing international agricultural trade rules deal with food 
security and the emphasis in the Draft Modalities in the ways suggested in the Rome 
Declaration seems to be only a positive move therefore. Such innovation gives a clear 
indication that the WTO is moving towards a greater recognition of its role in the 
implementation of the Millennium Development Goals and also understands its impact 
on vulnerable individuals. However, the Rome Declaration is predicated on resolving 
different problems of food security to that of the WTO: it is the difficulty of eradicating 
hunger which is the focus for the Rome Declaration, whereas the WTO rules concentrate 
on ameliorating the adverse effects on food supply of price rises caused by agricultural 
liberalization; these issues are distinct. Whilst the individual might benefit as a result of 
the WTO’s action, this is not an obligatory consequence of the WTO’s rules. Rather, for 
the WTO, the Member is thought to be best placed to address food security concerns in 
ways which are the most appropriate for its domestic population. The WTO rules 
emphasis, therefore, is on keeping the Members’ domestic policy space as open as 
possible so Members can pursue food security issues through their domestic agricultural 
policies, whilst only limiting Members’ use of trade measures where they exacerbate 
trade tensions. Moving the WTO away from this pro-autonomy stance towards the 
recognition of the food security rights of the individual has profound ripple effects.  
 
There is a power shift from the Members to the WTO as an organisation: it would be for 
the WTO (through dispute settlement) to determine whether the individual in the 
Member’s territory actually benefitted from the Member’s food security policies or not, 
rather than the Member itself as in the current rules. This new assessment would involve 
the WTO assessing various policy options against one of several possible benchmarks to 
decide whether the Member’s policies were successful or not. This is a significant 
incursion into the autonomy of the Member and a constraint on the Member’s ability to 
act in the best interests of its population. This change to the existing rules would in fact 
narrow the Member’s policy space in regard to food security with the consequence that 
the Member is less able to react to the needs of its domestic population. However, the fact 
that many Members have made at commitments to human rights treaties, a broadly 
conceived ‘right to food’ may be thought to be a necessary constraint on Member 
autonomy as the WTO matures as an organisation. 
 
How, then, should international trade negotiators proceed in the face of growing global 
food insecurity? The way forward to is re-evaluate the richness of the existing 
international agricultural trade rules in each context in which change is mooted and to re-
	  47	  	  
think what change should look like in this highly politicised environment. It is important 
to remember that the international agricultural trade rules do not purport to be a panacea 
to all the worlds’ ills in every aspect of food security. Rather, they balance the need to 
liberalize international agricultural trade with the potential adverse effects on food 
supplies. The absence of fuller recognition of all the dimensions of food security within 
the existing rules (and the Draft Modalities) does not mean that food security is ignored 
by the international trade regulation. Instead, it means that the power to control food 
security lies elsewhere. Specifically, it is the Member who retains the right to address 
food security through its agricultural policies in the ways that are best suited to its 
domestic circumstances.  It is for the Member to make important trade-offs between the 
various non-trade concerns. Contrary to some account of the relationship between the 
international agricultural trade rules and food security, my view of the function of the 
rules is that they are designed to keep the Member’s policy space open as wide as 
possible, whilst trying to maximise the trade liberalization objective. As this can only 
ever be a balance, inevitably, there will be times when greater power is held by the WTO 
– for  example specifying that food aid cannot be used as a disguised export subsidy – 
and times when greater power remains with the Member-for example in relation to export 
prohibitions on food security grounds. The international agricultural trade rules’ function 
is then not to impose any particular ‘correct’ way of achieving food security upon its 
various Members in all instances. To do so would be to impose a single vision of food 
security on all Members that disregards the fact that Members’ food security needs are 
widely diverse and fluctuate over time. It would disregard the fact too that Members’ 
policy responses must change and adapt to their own domestic circumstances. Whilst it 
might be thought it is for the WTO rules to require Members to guarantee a brighter 
future where their domestic populations are adequately fed, this view assumes that the 
Members do not share this goal and so need some external stimulus to pressure them into 
addressing the needs of their populations; in reality the converse is more likely.   
 
To see the existing international agricultural trade rules’ treatment of food security as 
striking a balance between state power and the need to liberalize international agricultural 
trade is also to ascribe a different function to the rules: they act as a stable point in an 
otherwise highly volatile and ever-changing environment, mediating between the need 
for stability and the desire for change as the problems of food security change and evolve. 
The rules’ very stability is what makes them useful, as Members know what their 
obligations are, and, over time, they can adapt and change their domestic agricultural 
policies in line with them. Radically changing a regulatory framework just because the 
political environment is ever changing is to misunderstand what makes rules effective in 
international agricultural trade. 
 
Instead, changes to the rules should be made in small, incremental ways that slightly 
refine the balance between trade liberalization and the adverse impact of the liberalization 
programme on food supply problems. This change should reflect the consensus of state 
practice when it has had time to settle into a particular pattern. Change should not be at 
the expense of the existing rules’ integrity. Since, it is clear that although the rules may 
not have achieved full liberalization of international agricultural trade yet, nor made huge 
inroads into alleviating food security, the rules have stabilised the legal landscape for 
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agricultural trade. The Draft Modalities can therefore be seen as a reflection of what 
current state practice is in the context of how food security will need to be regulated in 
international agricultural trade regulation at this point in time and what the power balance 
should be between the Members and the WTO. The Draft Modalities also reflect how 
Members believe food security fits into the larger picture of international agricultural 
trade regulation: for food security is only one dimension of the highly complex and 
intricate balance that the current rules strike between many diverse trade and non-trade 
issues. To advocate a fundamental change to the international agricultural trade rules’ 
treatment of food security would be to undermine the current rules’ success in stabilising 
the legal environment. In the words of Oakeshott, we should see innovation as “…an 
activity in which a valuable set of tools is renovated from time to time and kept in trim 
rather than as an opportunity for perpetual re-equipment.” (1991, 431) Change should be 
small, slow, incremental and in line with state practice. Not drastic, revolutionary and 
bold.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Endnotes 
 
I would like to thank Dr Christian Häberli, Professor Sean Coyle, Professor Maria Lee, colleagues at the 
UCL Centre for Law and the Environment and the editors of this collection for comments on an earlier 
draft of this article. Any errors remain my own. 
 
1 The 2002 Declaration adds in ‘social needs’ into the needs which must be met for food security to exist. 
2 This discussion focuses on the Rome Declaration’s definition on food security, but the same point is 
equally relevant to other definitions of food security. 
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